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Can Uslay, Z. Ayca Altintig, & Robert D. Winsor

An Empirical Examination of the
“Rule of Three”: Strategy
Implications for Top Management,
Marketers, and Investors
This study represents the first empirical examination of the “Rule of Three,” a theory at odds with several popular
notions regarding industry structure and business performance, including the positive linear market share–
performance relationship. In general, the findings from more than 160 industries support the Rule of Three and
provide five main insights: First, there appears to be a prevalent competitive structure for mature industries in which
three “generalist” firms control the market. Second, industries that conform to this structure tend to perform better
than industries with a fewer or greater number of generalists. Third, both “specialists” and generalists outperform
firms that are “stuck in the middle.” Fourth, the performance benefits of market leadership appear to diminish with
excessive market share. Fifth, the Rule of Three industry structure and its influence over firm profitability do not
appear to be priced appropriately by financial markets. The authors discuss the implications for multiple
stakeholders.
Keywords: Rule of Three, market share, marketing strategy, industry structure, profitability, market concentration,
number of firms, generalists, specialists

heth and Sisodia (2002) published The Rule of
Three: Surviving and Thriving in Competitive Markets to critical acclaim. Their book on market evolution and dynamics has wide-ranging corporate, marketing,
investment, and policy implications, some of which are at
odds with the positive linear market share–performance
relationship that has been heavily debated in marketing and
strategy literature (e.g., Buzzell 2004; Buzzell and Gale
1987; Ramanujam and Venkatraman 1984; Rumelt and
Wensley 1981; Szymanski, Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan
1993). Sheth and Sisodia make the case that an industry
structure consisting of three large generalists and numerous
smaller specialists generates a competitive environment that
is “optimal” for firm stability and profitability. In addition,
they argue that a nonlinear relationship between market

share and profitability exists in these structures, such that
both small- and large-share firms (within boundary conditions) can achieve high profitability, while midsized firms
are destined to languish. In summary, Sheth and Sisodia
theorize that (1) industries tend to evolve toward a dynamic
equilibrium with a specific structure and distribution of firm
sizes and (2) a company’s market share and degree of strategic focus are jointly related to its performance.
The Rule of Three theory has been publicized in a variety of practitioner-oriented publications.1 However, to our
knowledge, this current study represents the first attempt to
formally state related hypotheses and empirically test the
validity of the theory. In addition, we examine the degree to
which financial markets incorporate its implications in firm
valuation.
In developing the hypotheses, we augment the work of
Sheth and Sisodia (2002) with literature on ecological
resource partitioning (Carroll 1985, 1997) and industrial

S

Can Uslay is Assistant Professor of Marketing (e-mail: uslay@
chapman.edu), and Z. Ayca Altintig is Assistant Professor of Finance
(e-mail: altintig@chapman.edu), Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University. Robert D. Winsor is Professor of Marketing,
College of Business Administration, Loyola Marymount University (e-mail:
rwinsor@lmu.edu). The authors thank Philip Kotler, Glenn Carroll, David
Stewart, Naresh Malhotra, Goutam Challagalla, Peren Arin, Ekaterina
Karniouchina, Niklas Myhr, Glenn Omura, Koen Pauwels, Kapil Tuli, and
the three anonymous JM reviewers for their helpful comments on previous
versions of this article, as well as Jagdish Sheth and Rajendra Sisodia for
their encouragement and support. They acknowledge helpful comments
of participants at the 2007 INFORMS Marketing Science Conference in
Singapore, the Fall 2008 California Corporate Finance Conference in Los
Angeles, and the Fall 2008 Chapman University seminar series. They also
thank Birva Saraiya and Evrim Erdoğan for research assistance.
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1The Rule of Three (Sheth and Sisodia 2002) reviews or references have appeared in the Wall Street Journal (Sheth and Sisodia
1998), Harvard Business Review (Landry 2002), Academy of Management Executive (Saffersfone 2002), Entrepreneur (Henricks
2002), and Marketing Management (Gordon 2001), among others.
It was a finalist for the Berry–American Marketing Association
Book Prize. Philip Kotler (Sheth and Sisodia 2002, cover) praises
it as “one of the most provocative and original business books to
come out in years.” The Rule of Three arguably qualifies as a
theory because it includes systematically related statements and
lawlike generalizations that are empirically testable (Hunt 2002,
p. 193).
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organization (Porter 1980; Scherer 1980). We then test
these hypotheses using data from more than 160 industries
and two base-time periods (1997 and 2002). Our findings
suggest that firm performance is indeed influenced by both
industry structure and market share in a manner predicted
by the Rule of Three, and they yield several important corporate, marketing, and investment implications.

The Market Share–Performance
Relationship: Challenging
Conventional Wisdom
In the vast preponderance of industries, distributions of firm
sizes within an industry are highly skewed, such that a few
large firms dominate while many smaller firms occupy
minor market share positions (Axtell 2001; Buzzell 1981;
Gans and Quiggin 2003; Ijiri and Simon 1977; Quandt
1966). In their seminal work, Simon and Bonini (1958)
characterize numerous prior studies of firm size distribution
as “monotonously similar,” and Axtell (2006, p. 3) more
recently remarked that “data of such vast regularity are
highly unusual in the social sciences.”
Viewing the issue of firm size distribution as strategic
and cost driven, Bruce Henderson, at the helm of the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG), observed that stable and
competitive markets are regularly dominated by three primary competitors, and he described this pattern as The Rule
of Three and Four (BCG 1976; Henderson 1979). Henderson also claimed that the market shares of these three firms
are approximately distributed in the ratio of 4:2:1 (BCG
1976).
Of particular importance to all business disciplines is
the widely held conviction that market share and profitability are strongly positively related, both for U.S. markets
(Buzzell and Gale 1987) and for foreign markets (Douglas
and Craig 1983; Kotabe et al. 1991). According to the
majority of studies on this topic, there is a linear (or at least
monotonic) positive relationship between market share and
financial performance (Branch 1980; Buzzell 2004; Kohli,
Venkatraman, and Grant 1990; Shepherd 1972; Szymanski,
Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan 1993). Bharadwaj and
Varadarajan (2005) review seven schools of thought and
directly link market share to financial performance in their
integrated model. Buzzell and Gale (1987, p. 8) argue that
every 10 points of market share gain leads to approximately
3.5 points of return-on-investment (ROI) increase.
Conversely, a significant number of studies have challenged the conventional wisdom, arguing that (1) the relationship between market share and profitability is modest
and merely a spurious covariation that is solely or largely
due to unidentifiable factors (Boulding and Staelin 1990;
Jacobson 1990; Rumelt and Wensley 1981); (2) the relationship is context specific (Prescott, Kohli, and Venkatraman
1986); (3) the existence of the relationship does not necessarily imply that market share causes profitability (Demsetz
1973); (4) most industries do not display this relationship,
but the overall empirical evidence is likely skewed by a
minority of industries that display unusually strong positive
correlations between market share and profitability

(Schmalensee 1989; Slade 2004; Wensley 1997); and (5)
small firms can also commonly achieve high profitability,
suggesting that the relationship to market share is not a simple linear function (Hamermesh, Anderson, and Harris
1978; Porter 1980; Schwalbach 1991; Woo and Cooper
1981, 1982). Finally, several researchers have challenged
the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) data set on
which this relationship has typically been advanced (e.g.,
Anderson and Paine 1978; Ramanujam and Venkatraman
1984). Learning to date overwhelmingly depends on the
PIMS foundation (Farris and Moore 2004), though a metaanalysis concluded that its use has led to inflated estimates
of the market share–profitability relationship (Szymanski,
Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan 1993).
In Table 1, we present the reasons the pursuit of market
share might be simultaneously desirable or undesirable for
different stakeholders. It appears that there is no conclusive
verdict on the exact nature of this key relationship. Concurrent with our empirical examination, we respond to Kohli,
Venkatraman, and Grant’s (1990) call to examine the market share–profitability relationship using stock market–
based performance measures, alternative operationalizations of market share and performance, nonlinear models,
and non-PIMS data.

The Rule of Three Theory and
Hypotheses
Sheth and Sisodia (2002) draw from the extant literature
and an extensive range of observations to develop the Rule
of Three theory. They argue that industries evolve in a predictable way toward a dynamic equilibrium. This evolution
is suggested to be governed by a competitive process (reminiscent of the Schumpeterian evolution theorized by Nelson
and Winter [1982]) in which new and existing firms are
winnowed and consolidated. Sheth and Sisodia posit that
absent regulatory restraints or anticompetitive practices, any
given industry is expected to evolve and converge toward an
optimal structure in which there are three full-line generalists that are volume driven, numerous successful small specialists that are margin driven, and high overall industry
performance as measured by return on assets (ROA). However, this convergence can take several decades even without regulatory restraints. Following Sheth and Sisodia, we
define a generalist as a firm that serves the general market
with a full line of offerings and has 10%–40% or higher
market share. In the vast majority of industries with three
generalists, their combined share is well above 50% and can
approach 70%–90%. A specialist is defined as a firm that
focuses on a differentiated product or market niche and possesses less than 5% market share (Sheth and Sisodia 2002).
The convergence to three generalists is driven by four influences that serve both to increase firm efficiency and to govern the nature of competition within the industry: industry
cost structures and shared infrastructures, government intervention or deregulation, industry consolidation or globalization, and the creation of technological process or product
standards (Sheth and Sisodia 2002; see also Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999; Klepper and Simons 1997; Mascarenhas 1995; Scherer 1980).
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TABLE 1
Perspectives For and Against Market Share Orientation
Advantages of High Market Share

Disadvantages of High Market Share

Top management •Creates efficiency (i.e., cost advantage) through
economies of scale (Demsetz 1986).
•Cost advantage can serve as a barrier to entry
(Porter 1980).
•Demonstrates market leadership/power.
•Signals management skill (Ailawadi, Farris, and
Parry 1999).
•It is prominently linked to executive
compensation/bonus (Ritz 2008).

•Benefits are based on management folklore, and
market share orientation can shrink profits
(Armstrong and Collopy 1996).
•May decrease organizational aspirations and lull the
firm to sleep (Boulding and Staelin 1993; Drucker
1982).
•May limit future growth opportunities.

Marketing

•Can lead to decreased customer satisfaction
•Consumers can perceive it as a sign of quality
(Fornell 1995; e.g., AOL).
(Smallwood and Conlisk 1979) or better value
•Will decay the appeal of exclusivity for prestigious
proposition (Hellofs and Jacobson 1999).
brands.
•Decreases perceived social risk for customers
•Benefits of scale and scope are limited in
(Cialdini 1993).
•Typically correlates with customer loyalty and sales differentiated (i.e., most branded) markets.
stability (Ehrenberg, Goodhardt, and Barwise 1990;
Sharp et al. 2002).
•More efficient use of marketing dollars.
•Brand, channel, and customer equity can serve as
barriers to entry (Karakaya and Stahl 1989).

Finance

•Decreases firm-specific (default) risk.
•Increases analyst coverage and liquidity.

•Increases industry-specific (downside) risk (e.g.,
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers).
•Increases exposure to systematic risk.

Public policy

•Network externalities can increase consumer
welfare.

•It leads to market power and collusion (Bain 1956).
•More pressure from consumer advocacy groups
(Bloom and Kotler 1975).

Ecological resource partitioning theory (Carroll 1985,
1997) focuses on the competitive dynamics between/among
generalists and specialists and provides ample support for
the evolution toward few generalists and the Rule of Three
theory. Simply put, abundant and wide-ranging resources in
an industry lead to a proliferation of generalists, which then
attract and allow for the formation of numerous specialists
that pursue peripheral niches within the market (Carroll
1985). However, in the process, the resource base per generalist is also stretched thinner. The degree of strategic overlap among generalists is high, and they compete directly
with one another for the same central scarce resources,
decreasing their overall survival rate. In contrast, specialists
do not compete as intensely because of their differentiation
and focus in niche markets (Swaminathan 2001). In summary, resource partitioning theory predicts that as markets
mature and become more concentrated, the death rate (birth
rate) of generalists increases (decreases), and the death rate
(birth rate) of specialists decreases (increases) (Carroll
1985; Carroll, Dobrev, and Swaminathan 2002; Swaminathan 2001). Scale economies benefit larger generalists
more, jeopardizing the success and survival of small- to
midsized generalists, thus further increasing market concentration (Dobrev and Carroll 2003; Peli and Nooteboom 1999).
Resource partitioning theory predictions have been empirically supported in a diverse range of single-industry studies,
including the film industry, banking, newspapers, the early
and later deregulated telephone industry, microprocessor
manufacturers, breweries, and wineries (Mezias and Mezias
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2000). Resource partitioning theory (Carroll 1985) and the
Rule of Three theory (Sheth and Sisodia 2002) appear to be
in agreement regarding the basic evolution of markets; however the Rule of Three is more outcome than process oriented and predicts convergence to three generalists.
According to Sheth and Sisodia (2002), the Rule of
Three industry structure (in the context of industry structure, we use the term “R3”), defined as a mature and
competitive industry with exactly three generalists, is optimal because the three generalists act as the tripod that stabilizes the industry against hypercompetition or collusion.
Industries with more than three generalists are expected to
experience lower profitability because of more intensive
competition and the resultant pressure on profit margins.
“The tendency to maximize joint industry profits breaks
down if the industry contains more than three or four firms
of substantial size” (Miller 1967, p. 264). Additional generalists are not necessary to maintain the competitive balance
and thus become expendable during the drive for efficiency
(Sheth and Sisodia 2002).
More generalists imply less multimarket contact
between any two generalists, which diminishes opportunities for tacit collusion through “mutual forbearance” and
serves to enhance competitive intensity (Jayachandran,
Gimeno, and Varadarajan 1999). This outcome can be
observed through the increased likelihood and incidence of
price wars or other means of retaliation (e.g., competing
sales promotions, advertising expenditure, distribution
scope, new product introductions; see Kuester, Homburg,

2Naturally, a new specialist may also be lured to enter and influence industry profitability. However, the Rule of Three has no specific prediction regarding the difference in average profitability for
new specialists in a two- versus three-generalist industry setting.

be overly competitive, driving producers’ profits toward
zero. Only three-player markets consistently generated
Nash equilibrium (optimal) outcomes.
We capture the Rule of Three arguments regarding
industry structure and the relationship between market
share and profitability with the following hypotheses:
H1: An industry structure consisting of three generalists is
more prevalent than other structures for mature industries.
H2: R3 industries (i.e., those with three generalists) perform
better than those with more than three generalists.
H3: R3 industries (i.e., those with three generalists) perform
better than those with fewer than three generalists.

Sheth and Sisodia (2002) argue that generalists (with
10%–40% market share) benefit from a positive relationship between market share and performance (see Figure 1).
The two most common economic explanations as to why
market share leads to higher profitability are efficiency
(achieved through economies of scale and experience) and
market power (Jacobson 1988). According to the efficiency
argument, economies of scale that result from higher sales
volumes can provide cost advantages to larger firms (Demsetz 1986; Gale and Branch 1982; Porter 1980; Sharp et al.
2002). Conversely, market power (which results when a
firm is larger than many of its rivals) can allow firms to
extract concessions from channel members, engage in collusive behavior with similarly sized rivals, or maintain
supranormal prices within the marketplace (Bain 1956;
Boulding and Staelin 1993; Slade 2004; Stigler 1964). Market share can also affect the perceived quality of firms’
offerings through signaling, by creating network externalities, and as a distinct attribute in customers’ quality assessments (for other advantages, see Table 1). Thus, largemarket-share generalists would be expected to outperform
their smaller generalist rivals.
Small (specialist) firms that are likely to be operating at
suboptimal scales of efficiency (Audretsch 1995;
Audretsch, Prince, and Thurik 1999) can also achieve high
profits through differentiation or focus (Porter 1979, 1980).
Small firms avoid competing against large generalists by
serving market niches (or peripheral markets, according to
FIGURE 1
The Rule of Three
1%

Financial Performance
(ROA)

and Robertson 1999) among a greater number of generalists. For example, generalists (in the machine tool and computer workstation manufacturing industries) have been
found to introduce new products at a higher rate than specialists and to suffer more because of too many and too
risky product introductions (Sorenson et al. 2006).
Somewhat counterintuitively, the Rule of Three predicts
that industries with fewer than three generalists will also
experience decreased profitability (Sheth and Sisodia
2002). When only two generalists exist within a market,
each is more likely to engage in predatory competition
(leading to the elimination of one firm) or collusion (tacit or
otherwise), either of which will ultimately result in de facto
monopoly and, thus, complacency, decreased innovation,
and decreased quality (Sheth and Sisodia 2002). With three
generalists, the possibility of a retaliatory alliance between
two competitors (i.e., balance of power) discourages/
prevents predatory attacks (Sheth and Sisodia 2002). In
other words, the R3 industry structure should offer an optimal mix of competition, collaboration, and customer value
in mature industries, resulting in higher profitability.
Resource partitioning theory also supports this expectation, with the reasoning that two generalist firms would not
be able to cover as much resource space as three generalists,
implying lower utilization of the market’s potential and,
thus, lower overall profitability (Boone, Carroll, and Van
Witteloostuijn 2004; Swaminathan 2001). Moreover,
(fewer) generalists may be preoccupied with market
defense and more likely to build market entry barriers
through excessive product/brand proliferation (Mainkar,
Lubatkin, and Schulze 2006; Sorenson et al. 2006) and/or
limit/penetration pricing (Caves, Fortunato, and Ghemawat
1984; Porter 1980). Therefore, such industries might also
experience lower profitability due to excessive (rather than
too little) innovation or lower margins resulting from proactive (rather than reactive) strategies.
Furthermore, the mere presence of only two generalists
with high profitability might itself signal a larger market
gap and entice new competitors (Scherer 1980). Such a new
competitor may (1) likely fail during entry but depress
industry profitability until it exits (or is acquired), (2) survive initially but fail to acquire the market share necessary
to establish itself as a viable player and subsequently
depress industry profitability (see the discussion for “the
ditch”), or (3) succeed as a healthy generalist and thus cause
convergence to three generalists in accordance with the
Rule of Three.2 In either scenario, it appears that the Rule
of Three expectation prevails.
Finally, further support for the Rule of Three’s theory of
the optimal generalist population stems from game theory
literature. From a meta-analysis of extant experimental literature and a series of oligopoly experiments, Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004, p. 435) conclude that “[t]wo
are few and four are many.” They observe collusion within
duopolies, whereas markets with four or five players tend to

Product/
market
specialist

Full-line
generalist
5%

40%

10%

Market Share
Notes: Reproduced with the authors’ permission (Sheth and
Sisodia 2002, p. 4).
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resource partitioning theory) that are less accessible to large
firms and thus operate in separate competitive arenas (Carroll 1985; Caves and Porter 1977; Nooteboom 1994; Porter
1979; Swaminathan 2001). Customer loyalty toward specialists also makes it difficult for generalists to imitate specialists and replicate their success. For example, in general,
early efforts by Anheuser-Busch to replicate the success of
microbreweries failed, even though the firm possesses the
necessary resources and technology (Swaminathan 2001).
Thus, small firms may often achieve high price–cost margins and high overall profitability (Audretsch, Prince, and
Thurik 1999).
Sheth and Sisodia (2002) conceptualize firms that possess 5%–10% share of the market as being in “the ditch”
because such firms compete without either the benefit of the
efficiencies that can come from greater scale/market share
or the effectiveness of a focus strategy. Specialists have a
deep understanding of one or a few segments, whereas generalists have a broad knowledge of the entire industry.
“Ditch dwellers” have neither. These tend to be small firms
that have overgrown their niches (e.g., People Express) or
undersized full-line companies (e.g., Continental Airlines).
Resource partitioning theory makes an equivalent argument: Larger generalists gain advantages as a result of
economies of scale, such that the overall losers of this
competitive process are typically smaller generalists (Peli
and Nooteboom 1999). “When the large organizations
enter, those in the middle of the size distribution are
trapped. Whatever strategy they adopt to fight off the challenge of the larger form makes them more vulnerable in
competition with small organizations, and vice versa. That
is, at least in a stable environment the two ends of the size
distribution ought to outcompete in the middle” (Hannan
and Freeman 1977, p. 946). Consequently, firms “stuck in
the middle” (Porter 1980) or, equivalently, “in the ditch”
(Sheth and Sisodia 2002) lack strategic focus and have more
limited opportunities to achieve high levels of profitability.
Although the expectation that firms in the ditch will perform worse than smaller-share rivals is counter to evidence
from most PIMS-based and industrial organization studies,
it garners some empirical support. For example, Caves and
Porter (1977), Hamermesh, Anderson, and Harris (1978),
and Woo and Cooper (1982) find that smaller-share competitors can be equally or more profitable than larger-share
rivals, while midshare firms may perform the worst (Dobrev
and Carroll 2003; Schwalbach 1991), suggesting that the
relationship between market share and profitability is nonmonotonic. Similarly, in a study of Dutch daily newspapers,
Boone, Carroll, and Van Witteloostuijn (2004) show that
both generalists and specialists had higher growth and profitability than those stuck in the middle. Amburgey, Dacin,
and Kelly’s (1994) study of credit unions reveals a “danger
zone” of intermediate firm size in which the risks of failure
(or merger) are significantly greater than they are for either
very small or large firms, resulting in an industry bifurcation into these two size classes of competitors. Thus:
H4: Generalists perform better than firms in the ditch (i.e.,
firms with intermediate market share).
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H5: Specialists perform better than firms in the ditch (i.e.,
firms with intermediate market share).

In the economics literature, 40% market share is a generally accepted threshold for what is termed a “dominant
firm” (Scherer and Ross 1990; Shepherd 1990). Notably,
Sheth and Sisodia (2002) argue that generalists lose their
advantages from scale and scope when they achieve this
level of dominance. The diseconomy effect, along with
additional regulation and antitrust scrutiny, is likely to
become evident beyond 40% market share and lead to
diminished firm performance (Geroski 1987; Sheth and
Sisodia 2002). Market leaders may also price aggressively
to discourage challengers, which may hinder their profitability (Caves, Fortunato, and Ghemawat 1984). Resource
partitioning scholars have also noted that surviving generalists tend to become larger and more general over time, an
inertia that would be expected eventually to drag down ratio
measures of performance (e.g., ROA, return on sales
[ROS]) of the top generalist (Carroll and Hannan 2000).
The notion that dominant firms may experience lower
performance contradicts the market share → performance
dictum reinforced by numerous PIMS-based empirical studies (e.g., Buzzell and Gale 1987). Bloom and Kotler (1975,
p. 65) specifically criticize PIMS-based research findings in
this regard, noting that the approach “does not reveal
whether profitability eventually turns down at very high
market-share levels;… therefore, the behavior of ROI in
response to still higher market shares is undisclosed.”
Notably, a few empirical studies have also reported that
high market share might hurt performance. For example,
Schwalbach (1991) observes that large-share competitors
(those with greater than 35%–65% market share, depending
on industry) are frequently less profitable than slightly
smaller rivals, indicating that market share may not contribute to profitability beyond a certain size. Similarly,
Boulding and Staelin (1990, 1993) find that diminished performance (i.e., increasing costs) often accompanies very
large market share, and Armstrong and Collopy (1996) find
that market share orientation shrinks profits.
Alternative explanations have been advanced as to why
market share above a certain level may lead to lower firm
performance. For example, Boulding and Staelin (1993)
suggest that market share can be conceptualized as a measure of organizational success relative to aspiration level,
such that “fat and happy” firms are no longer competitively
efficient. In other words, as market share reaches or surpasses a firm’s aspirational level, “success breeds complacency” (Boulding and Staelin 1993, p. 147; Drucker 1982).
These aspirations may also be dulled at some level by
managerial concerns over competitive reactions or antitrust
issues. There is also evidence that customer satisfaction
may decrease with high market share (Anderson, Fornell,
and Lehmann 1994; Fornell 1995), which would then
depress profitability (for other disadvantages, see Table 1).
Conversely, very small specialists with less than 1%
market share are considered too small to generate substantial brand, customer, or channel equity (Sheth and Sisodia
2002). They also tend to lack the ability and resources to
commercialize innovation or serve as change agents on

their own. Typically, the lucky few that come up with a
promising breakthrough are either acquired and subsumed
or grow to become successful and legitimate specialists
(with more than 1% share). Microfirms dominate the economy in numbers but not in impact or superior performance
(Aldrich 1999). For example, lifestyle firms would fall
under this category. Thus:
H6: Generalists with excessive (i.e., >40%) market share perform worse than other generalists.
H7: Specialists with insufficient (i.e., <1%) market share perform worse than other specialists.

Data and Methodology
We compiled the majority of the data for the study from
three sources: Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT (Research
Insight), the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) database, and the U.S. Census
Bureau. COMPUSTAT contains accounting data for all
North American companies that file annual reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Firms with
multiple business units/segments are required to file separate reports for each of these segments with the SEC. The
initial data set consisted of information on the entire sample
of U.S. firms and all their business units/segments for the
years 1997 and 2002. These years represented the most
recent U.S. economic census data available, and the only
periods in which the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes were used during data collection. We identified the industries by five-digit primary
NAICS codes. We obtained aggregate sales figures for each
NAICS code from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the
practice of similar studies in finance, we excluded from our
sample firms with incomplete information in COMPUSTAT
or CRSP databases as well as financial firms (because their
accounting-based performance measures do not lend themselves to the same interpretation as nonfinancial [industrial]
firms [Ritter 1991]).
To reiterate, Sheth and Sisodia (2002) define generalists
as firms with ≥10% market share (i.e., “critical mass” to
benefit from economies of scale and scope), specialists as
firms with <5% market share, and those in the ditch as
every firm in between. We followed their definitions to test
the theory. However, taking other perspectives into consideration and to ensure robust and generalizable results, we
specified and analyzed four additional specifications for the
threshold dividing generalists from firms in the ditch:
specifically, 12.5%, 15%, 17.5%, and 20% share of the market (for rationale, see the Appendix). Subsequently, we classified industries that had exactly three generalists as R3
industries. We calculated market share as the total dollar
sales of the firm (or the business unit for a diversified firm)
divided by the total dollar sales in the firm’s (or unit’s) primary NAICS code.
We used two major performance measures in the analyses: operating return on assets (oROA) and annual cumulative abnormal return (CAR). We calculated oROA as the
operating income of the firm or unit divided by the total
identifiable assets of the firm or unit. We used oROA

instead of net ROA to retain the data from firms with separate lines of businesses. For firms with multiple business
units, it is not possible to calculate reliable net earnings
measures for a given unit. Furthermore, operating measures
are much more meaningful in measuring the effects of market share because these do not take into account any gains
from off–balance sheet accounting and financial investments.
The performance effects of market share and industry
structure should be relatively stable and enduring. Therefore, we also examined the forward-looking three-year
averages of operating performance for the firms in our sample. We used the three fiscal years following 1997 (i.e.,
1998–2000) and 2002 (i.e., 2003–2005) in our calculations.
Next, we analyzed the stock market performance of the
firms in our sample to determine whether variations in operating profitability are considered in the valuation by financial markets. We obtained the monthly return data used in
CAR calculations from CRSP. We excluded from this
analysis firms or business units that did not have stock data.
We calculated stock market performance as the mean
annual CAR during fiscal years 1997 and 2002 and for the
three-year (36-month) period following the end of fiscal
years 1997 and 2002. We calculated the annualized CAR
for security j as follows:

(1)


CAR j = 



∏(
36

t =1

)

3
AR jt + 1  − 1,


1

where AR represents the abnormal return during month t for
security j. Abnormal return is the excess return earned by a
stock above the expected risk-adjusted return in a given
period based on the market model. In other words, abnormal return is
(2)

ARjt = Rjt – (αj + βjRMt),

where Rjt is the actual observed return on stock j during
month t. The term in parentheses represents the riskadjusted expected return for stock j during month t. We estimated this systematic risk factor β using the historical
returns on stock j during the [–120, –12]-month period
around the abnormal return calculation. We estimated beta
using the following regression model:
(3)

Rjt = αj + βjRMt + εjt,

where RMt is the return during month t on the CRSP valueweighted index.
Finally, note that the Rule of Three is applicable to
mature industries (Sheth and Sisodia 2002). Emerging markets (e.g., satellite radio) are not expected to support its
hypotheses, because they have not yet reached a state of
competitive (dynamic) equilibrium. Therefore, we excluded
all industries that were younger than 15 years from the sample. We calculated industry age as the maximum age of the
firms in the NAICS code (we obtained firm age from
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). The resultant
sample consisted of 1369 firms from 152 industries for
1997 and 1108 firms from 165 industries for 2002.
We used simple t-tests for univariate tests. In the regression models, we used firm size and market-to-book ratios as
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ner support both for the evolutionary logic of the Rule of
Three and for H1.
As Table 2 shows, H2 is supported because R3 industries performed significantly better than industries with
more generalists for every performance measure for both
years (the only exception is annual CAR for 2002, which is
significant at the .10 level). (Operating) ROA, the main performance measure advocated by the Rule of Three, is
highly significant for both years. For example, the R3
industry oROA average is 16.52% for 1997, whereas industries with more generalists average only 5.42%.
Conversely, Table 2 also shows that R3 industries also
performed significantly better than industries with fewer
generalists for all but one performance measure. For example, the R3 industry oROA average is 15.1% for 2002,
whereas industries with fewer generalists average only
4.89%. The only exception is the annual CAR measure. We
have been consistently conservative in our CAR measurements (see the Appendix), which may have diminished the
significance of our CAR-related test results. Nevertheless,
the annual CAR results are significant for both 1997 and
2002 at the .10 level, which is a widely reported confidence
level for CAR findings in finance and marketing literature
(e.g., Adrian and Rosenberg 2008; Luo and Homburg
2008). Therefore, in general, we find support for H3. Further t-tests (unreported) comparing R3 industry performance with industries specifically with two (G2) and/or
four (G4) generalists also verified the reported findings. In
all tests, firms in R3 industries performed significantly better than those from alternative industry structures.
In Table 3, we present regression analyses that provide
further support for our findings. The main variable of interest in these regressions is the R3 dummy variable, which
takes the value of one if the firm is in an R3 industry (i.e.,
an industry with exactly three generalists). The coefficients

control variables for operating and stock market performance, following the practice in finance research (e.g., Barber and Lyon 1997). We incorporated market concentration,
calculated as the sum of the top four firms’ market shares,
in model development to account for competitive intensity.
To minimize the effects of composite variable bias (Farris,
Parry, and Ailawadi 1992), we used number of employees
as a proxy for firm size because both assets and sales
are part of the dependent variable calculation. We used ordinary least squares models with White heteroskedasticitycorrected standard errors in the regression analyses. We
included dummy variables for each firm to control for any
firm-specific (unobserved) effects in these regressions. We
do not report coefficients for the dummy variables because
of space constraints. Alternative calculation methods and
use of operating ROS (oROS) as a performance measure
revealed qualitatively the same results (for additional
robustness checks, see the Appendix).

Results and Discussion
Industry convergence to three generalists is a central axiom
of the Rule of Three. As Figure 2 shows, the mode for the
frequency distribution of the number of generalists is consistently three (i.e., 62 industries representing 41% of the
1997 sample and 74 industries representing 45% of the
2002 sample). We conducted sensitivity analyses to ensure
that the mode three is not merely an outcome of the way we
operationalized generalists. The mode for the number of
generalists remained three for alternative boundary cutoff
points at every percentage point above 7% and below 22%
market share, suggesting that the finding is robust. In addition, plots for industry age versus the number of generalists
(unreported) displayed a pattern of industry convergence to
three generalists over time. Therefore, we were able to gar-

FIGURE 2
Frequency Distribution of Generalists (with 10% Market Share Threshold)
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TABLE 2
Mean Performance of R3 Industries Versus Industries with More and Fewer Than Three Generalists
A: 1997 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio

<3 Generalists
(G0, 1, 2)

Difference
(R3 – G0, 1, 2)
t-Statistic

R3
Industries

Difference
(R3 – G4, 5+)
t-Statistic

>3 Generalists
(G4, 5+)

5.522
8.572
2.054
2.973
14.095

3.14***
2.05**
1.89*
2.03**
2.22**

16.520
14.029
3.566
4.518
21.504

4.15***
3.01***
2.27**
2.15**
2.46***

5.424
7.732
2.020
2.821
16.827

B: 2002 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio

<3 Generalists
(G0, 1, 2)

Difference
(R3 – G0, 1, 2)
t-Statistic

R3
Industries

Difference
(R3 – G4, 5+)
t-Statistic

>3 Generalists
(G4, 5+)

4.887
6.528
1.870
2.206
16.340

2.24**
2.18**
1.74*
2.10**
2.17**

15.102
11.527
2.211
3.860
19.730

3.15***
2.19**
1.88*
2.00**
2.21**

6.982
5.956
1.197
1.891
14.840

*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: G0, G1, G2, and G4 denote industries with 0, 1, 2, and 4 generalists, respectively, and G5+ denotes industries with 5 or more
generalists.

for the R3 dummy are consistently positive and significant
for all performance measures, indicating enhanced performance due to the presence of the R3 structure. R3 coefficients are also consistently significantly higher than those
for two- or four-generalist industries for both 1997 and
2002. Furthermore, the R3 effect persists despite the inclusion of market concentration and market share. Therefore,
the R3 effect cannot be fully accounted for by any of these
variables or the traditional explanations they represent (i.e.,
market power and efficiency). R3 interactions with market
share and with market concentration are both positive and
significant, indicating complex moderation effects between
R3 and performance. (Moreover, these synergistic R3
effects tend to exceed those from other industry structures.)
It appears that the R3 effect helps firms capture many benefits of efficiency and market power but also provides them
with a structural advantage that goes beyond these basic
explanations. Although beyond the scope of our current
effort, future inquiry of these effects is warranted.
The Rule of Three theory suggests a nonmonotonic
“hockey stick” relationship between market share and performance (see Figure 1). Similarly, Porter (1980) suggests a
U-shaped relationship between market share and profitability. To account for potential nonlinearity in the relationship,
we included the square of the market share term in the
regressions. In general, the coefficients for the squared market share term are positive and significant, implying a nonmonotonic convex function, which is consistent with the
Rule of Three. The existence of such a relationship when
fitting linear models could result in confounded (and, thus,
nonsignificant) findings. This might explain why some

researchers have found little or no empirical relationship
between market share and performance. The variance inflation factor values for the regressions were all below the recommended benchmark of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (Neter et al. 1996, p. 387).
In Table 4, we present the t-tests that compare the performance of generalist firms with those in the ditch. In general, the results are more significant with 1997 data (the
price–earnings ratio is the only performance measure that is
significant when using the 2002 sample). This may be
because of the postrecession slump included in the 2002
data and/or imply that the ditch range may benefit from further delineation in future research. Still, H4 is supported by
four of the five tests (including oROA) for the 1997 sample,
implying that generalist firms are typically more profitable
than those in the ditch. For example, average oROA for the
generalists in 1997 is 10.58%, whereas the average oROA
for ditch dwellers is 6.3%. This finding would also be
expected by neoclassical economic theory.
In Table 4, we also present the t-tests of the performance metrics for specialist firms versus those “in the
ditch.” Specialists significantly outperform the firms in the
ditch for all measures (with the exception of oROA for
2002). Among others, specialists have higher price–earnings
(P/E) ratios (P/E of 22.54 for 2002) and better stock market
performance than firms in the ditch (P/E of 13.95 for 2002).
The implication is that the market may actually discount the
stock value of firms in the ditch because of some anticipation of problems for these firms and reflect these in their
future growth prospects, as measured by price–earnings
ratios. These concerns are also potentially reflected in the
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TABLE 3
Effects of Industry Structure on Firm Performance
1997 Sample
Dependent Variable
Intercept
Market share (MS)
MS2
Number of employees
Market-to-book ratio
Firm age
Market concentration (MC)
One generalist (G1)
Two generalists (G2)
R3
Four generalists (G4)
Five+ generalists (G5+)
G1 × MS

G2 × MS

R3 × MS

G4 × MS

G5 × MS

G1 × MC

G2 × MC

R3 × MC

2002 Sample

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

.050
(1.26)
.395*
(1.77)
.564**
(2.28)
–.0061*
(–1.87)
.003**
(2.04)
.001
(1.05)
.251**
(1.99)
–.053
(–1.40)
.101*
(1.88)
.130**
(2.03)
.055
(1.62)
.032
(1.36)
.013*
(1.81)
.025**
(2.02)
.049***
(2.63)
.025*
(1.90)
.008
(1.67)
.092*
(1.94)
.058**
(1.97)
.081**
(2.06)

.063
(1.32)
.431**
(2.02)
.599***
(3.02)
–.004*
(–1.88)
.006**
(2.13)
.001
(1.25)
.352**
(2.04)
–.081
(–1.56)
.181**
(2.10)
.319***
(4.01)
.084
(1.67)
.042
(1.35)
.014*
(1.90)
.021**
(2.12)
.041***
(2.67)
.021*
(1.74)
.006
(1.41)
.085*
(1.78)
.062**
(2.01)
.093**
(2.10)

.001
(1.02)
.003*
(1.73)
.006*
(1.84)
–.0004*
(–1.92)
.0003**
(2.06)
.0002
(.78)
.003*
(1.87)
–.004
(–1.21)
.006*
(1.75)
.009**
(2.09)
.002
(1.46)
.001
(1.19)
.007*
(1.93)
.001*
(1.73)
.004**
(2.05)
.001
(1.69)
.001
(1.21)
.001
(1.66)
.002*
(1.74)
.008**
(2.18)

.001
(1.04)
.004*
(1.77)
.005*
(1.83)
–.0005*
(–1.90)
.0005**
(2.08)
.0003
(.79)
.004*
(1.93)
–.003
(1.24)
.005*
(1.77)
.011**
(2.17)
.003
(1.51)
.002
(1.21)
.009*
(1.94)
.001*
(1.74)
.005**
(2.04)
.001*
(1.72)
.001
(1.23)
.001*
(1.74)
.003*
(1.81)
.008**
(2.21)

.003
(1.09)
.516*
(1.80)
.589**
(2.21)
–.005*
(–1.79)
.002**
(1.99)
.001
(1.38)
.361**
(2.04)
–.051
(–1.14)
.113**
(2.16)
.136***
(3.77)
.088**
(1.98)
.020
(1.05)
.012*
(1.79)
.034*
(1.78)
.066**
(2.01)
.022
(1.58)
.006
(1.65)
.090*
(1.90)
.031**
(1.99)
.138***
(3.31)

.003
(1.07)
.581*
(1.72)
.796**
(2.24)
–.005*
(–1.81)
.002**
(2.03)
.001
(1.35)
.416**
(2.12)
–.077
(–1.16)
.109**
(2.14)
.129***
(3.21)
.071*
(1.82)
.033
(1.28)
.013*
(1.82)
.035**
(2.04)
.037***
(2.45)
.015*
(1.93)
.007
(1.48)
.065*
(1.74)
.052*
(1.76)
.147**
(2.22)

.0005
(1.08)
.008*
(1.77)
.004**
(2.03)
–.0002*
(–1.84)
.0004**
(2.18)
.001
(1.23)
.002*
(1.77)
–.001
(–1.03)
.004*
(1.86)
.007**
(2.02)
.001
(1.52)
.001
(1.18)
.007*
(1.93)
.0003
(1.58)
.001**
(1.97)
.0004
(1.43)
.001
(1.34)
.001
(1.66)
.001*
(1.80)
.001**
(1.98)

.0002
(1.10)
.010*
(1.82)
.007**
(2.06)
–.0003*
(–1.92)
.0005**
(2.17)
.001
(1.24)
.003*
(1.74)
–.003
(–1.12)
.006*
(1.84)
.008**
(2.05)
.001
(1.56)
.001
(1.17)
.006*
(1.95)
.0004
(1.59)
.001*
(.199)
.0003
(1.52)
.001
(1.41)
.001*
(1.74)
.001*
(1.83)
.001*
(1.99)

TABLE 3
Continued
1997 Sample
Dependent Variable

2002 Sample

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

G5 × MC

.020*
(1.70)
.018*
(1.69)

.027*
(1.73)
.020*
(1.73)

.001*
(1.70)
.001
(1.43)

.001*
(1.72)
.001
(1.36)

.036*
(1.80)
.020*
(1.73)

.038*
(1.87)
.030*
(1.83)

.0003
(1.38)
.002
(1.38)

.0002
(1.24)
.002
(1.49)

Firm dummies
N
Adjusted R2
F

Yes
1369
.370
14.28***

Yes
1369
.382
14.31***

Yes
1064
.174
15.99***

Yes
1064
.189
17.06***

Yes
1108
.421
16.93***

Yes
1108
.401
16.12***

Yes
827
.143
16.43***

Yes
827
.178
15.42***

G4 × MC
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βR3 > βG2
βR3 > βG4
βR3 × MS > βG2 × MS
βR3 × MS > βG4 × MS

.0273**
<.0001***
.0615*
.0455**

.0061***
.0003***
.0617*
.0378**

.0098***
<.0001***
.0087***
.0298**

.0134**
<.0001***
.0091***
.0214**

.0273**
<.0001***
.0786*
.0485**

.0062***
<.0017***
.0699*
.0422**

.0214**
<.0001***
.0533*
.0028***

.0375**
<.0001***
.0478**
.0037***

*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: G0, G1, G2, and G4 denote industries with 0, 1, 2, and 4 generalists, respectively, and G5+ denotes industries with 5 or more generalists. Bold entries are specifically related to hypothesis
testing.

TABLE 4
Mean Performance of Generalists and Specialists Versus Firms in the Ditch
A: 1997 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio

Generalist

Difference
(Generalist – Ditch)
t-Statistic

Ditch

Difference
(Specialist – Ditch)
t-Statistic

Specialist

10.577
9.011
3.568
4.529
20.77

2.55***
1.82*
1.98**
2.01**
3.19***

6.290
7.847
1.990
2.366
16.81

2.18**
2.36***
2.16**
2.07**
2.26**

13.577
12.678
3.719
4.763
21.54

Generalist

Difference
(Generalist – Ditch)
t-Statistic

Ditch

Difference
(Specialist – Ditch)
t-Statistic

Specialist

12.425
11.741
1.550
1.585
18.74

1.23
1.55
1.80*
1.78*
1.92**

11.762
10.202
.674
.967
13.95

–1.25
3.12***
2.03**
1.98**
2.83***

10.609
12.560
1.797
2.014
22.54

B: 2002 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

lower CARs for these firms. Overall, H5 is supported by
nine of the ten performance tests.
In Table 5, we present the regression analyses that provide further support for the findings that firms in the ditch
tend to underperform. The main variable of interest in this
regression is the “ditch” dummy, which takes the value of 1
for firms with market share that is less than 10% but greater
than or equal to 5%. The ditch dummy is negative and significant for every performance measure. These results
clearly indicate that the ditch represents a range of
depressed profitability. Notably, the interaction between R3
and the ditch is positive and significant for three-year
oROA, indicating that the R3 effect is more dominant and
may mitigate the ditch penalty in the long run. That is, even
the firms in the ditch may benefit from the formation of an
R3 structure. We excluded market share measures, which
served to define the ditch dummies, from this set of regression specifications. The variance inflation factor values for
the regressions were all below the recommended benchmark of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue
(Neter et al. 1996, p. 387).
As Table 6, Panel A, shows, the results are significant
for six of the ten measures of performance for H6, suggesting that firms with excessively large market share tend to
underperform. However, there is no significant profitability
difference between generalists with more than 40% market
share and other generalists, as measured by oROA. Nevertheless, a longer-term orientation (examining forward-looking
three-year averages of operating performance) reveals that
generalists with more than 40% market share may perform
worse than other generalists. For example, the 1997 average
three-year oROA for generalists with more than 40% market share is 8.67%, whereas it is 11% for other generalists.
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Thus, the results are partially supportive of H6. In addition,
regression analyses in Table 5 provide inferential support
for H6. In these analyses, we employ a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 when the top firm of an industry has
more than 40% market share (“Number 1 firm MS > 40%”)
and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the top
firm of an industry has less than or equal to 40% market
share (“Number 1 firm MS < 40%”). The coefficients for
the latter dummy are consistently positive and significant,
in contrast to the former dummy variable. However, it is
unlikely that a specific market share point of maximum profitability universally applies to all generalists. Rather, it might
be possible to establish thresholds for each industry and
then establish specific ranges for different industry groups.
Thus, the 40% market share limit to performance should be
considered in the spirit of a guideline rather than a rule.
Table 6, Panel B, shows that the specialists with less
than 1% market share significantly underperform other specialists (i.e., those with 1%–5% market share) for all performance measures for both years. For example, the 1997
average oROA for specialists with less than 1% market
share is only 3.58%, whereas it is 21.87% for other specialists. Therefore, H7 is supported. Notably, the financial market seems to price in lower growth opportunities to these
small-share firms, causing their stock market performance
to be lower as well.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the support garnered for H6
and H7 renders our results for H4 and H5 all the more conservative. If we were to exclude generalists with more than
40% market share and specialists with less than 1% market
share from the H4 and H5 analyses, respectively, the results
for both tests would have been even stronger. We performed
further univariate tests and regression analyses using five
alternative lower boundary share measures for generalists

TABLE 5
The Effects of Ditch Status on Firm Performance
1997 Sample
Dependent Variable
Intercept
Number of employees
Market-to-book ratio
Firm age
Market concentration (MC)
Ditch
One generalist (G1)
Two generalists (G2)
R3
Four generalists (G4)
Five+ generalists (G5+)
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G1 × ditch

G2 × ditch

R3 × ditch

G4 × ditch

G5 × ditch

MC × ditch
Number 1 firm MS > 40%
Number 1 firm MS < 40%

2002 Sample

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

.034**
(2.21)
–.001***
(–2.55)
.0065**
(2.02)
.007
(1.41)
.015**
(2.01)
–.038***
(–2.73)
–.048
(–1.24)
.092*
(1.74)
.116***
(3.03)
.049
(1.59)
.034
(1.32)
–.003
(1.54)
–.008
(–1.47)
.018*
(1.93)
–.005
(–1.24)
.001
(.98)
–.002*
(–1.82)
–.010*
(–1.93)
.008**
(1.98)

.036**
(2.08)
–.0003***
(–2.51)
.006**
(2.06)
.004
(1.43)
.014**
(1.99)
–.033***
(–2.65)
–.032
(–1.15)
.105*
(1.86)
.125***
(3.14)
.051
(1.63)
.029
(1.27)
–.005
(1.58)
–.006
(–1.47)
.020**
(1.99)
–.005
(–1.25)
.002
(1.01)
–.002*
(1.71)
–.011*
(–1.95)
.014**
(2.13)

.047**
(2.14)
–.0002***
(–2.98)
.001**
(2.00)
.001
(.72)
.001**
(2.18)
–.008***
(–2.92)
–.003
(–1.43)
.004*
(1.95)
.005**
(2.24)
.002
(1.44)
.003
(1.04)
.001
(1.02)
–.002
(1.56)
.002*
(1.81)
–.002
(–1.07)
.001
(.78)
–.0002*
(1.69)
–.002*
(–1.82)
.002**
(1.98)

.051**
(2.11)
–.0002***
(–2.97)
.002**
(2.02)
.002
(.75)
.002**
(2.19)
–.006***
(–2.92)
–.002
(–1.32)
.003*
(1.92)
.005**
(2.23)
.003
(1.49)
.002
(1.01)
.001
(.99)
–.001
(1.27)
.002*
(1.89)
–.001
(–1.03)
.001
(.82)
.002*
(1.78)
–.002*
(–1.79)
.003**
(2.04)

.063***
(2.74)
–.0004***
(–2.86)
.004**
(2.04)
.004
(1.40)
.013**
(1.97)
–.054***
(–2.56)
–.034
(–1.18)
.108**
(1.97)
.091**
(2.08)
.067*
(1.75)
.039
(1.41)
–.002
(1.44)
–.007
(–1.40)
.013**
(1.96)
–.003
(–1.20)
.002
(.94)
–.005*
(–1.77)
–.009*
(–1.89)
.013**
(2.14)

.027**
(2.04)
–.0002***
(–2.94)
.001**
(2.00)
.001
(.72)
.011*
(1.78)
–.042**
(–2.08)
–.025
(–1.12)
.115**
(2.01)
.102**
(2.09)
.058
(1.67)
.024
(1.33)
–.003
(1.47)
–.008
(–1.41)
.017**
(1.99)
–.004
(–1.21)
.002
(1.01)
–.005*
(–1.85)
–.010**
(–1.95)
.018**
(2.20)

.083***
(2.95)
–.001***
(–2.49)
.002*
(1.80)
.001
(1.08)
.0004*
(1.81)
–.005**
(–2.01)
–.002
(–1.33)
.005**
(1.99)
.005**
(2.26)
.004*
(1.86)
.004
(1.12)
.001
(1.01)
–.001
(–1.50)
.003*
(1.83)
–.0007
(–.99)
.001
(.78)
–.001*
(–1.86)
–.002*
(–1.94)
.003**
(2.07)

.033***
(3.02)
–.0003**
(–2.24
.002*
(1.81)
.001
(1.07)
.004*
(1.89)
–.005**
(–2.25)
–.003
(–1.28)
.004**
(1.98)
.006**
(2.29)
.003
(1.65)
.002
(1.05)
.001
(.97)
–.001
(–1.47)
.002*
(1.78)
–.0005
(–.81)
.001
(.82)
–.001*
(–1.83)
–.003**
(–1.98)
.002**
(2.03)
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TABLE 5
Continued
1997 Sample

2002 Sample

Dependent Variable

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

oROA

Three-Year oROA

CAR

Three-Year CAR

Firm dummies
N
Adjusted R2
F

Yes
1369
.317
8.14***

Yes
1369
.323
9.07***

Yes
1064
.154
4.59***

Yes
1064
.145
3.96***

Yes
1108
.316
9.35***

Yes
1108
.325
8.93***

Yes
827
.128
12.41***

Yes
827
.111
7.97***

*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: G0, G1, G2, and G4 denote industries with 0, 1, 2, and 4 generalists, respectively, and G5+ denotes industries with 5 or more generalists. Bold entries are specifically related to
hypothesis testing.

TABLE 6
Mean Performance Effects of Excessive and Insufficient Market Share
A: The Case of Excessive Market Share
1997 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio

Generalist
with Market
Share > 40%

Generalist
with Market
Share < 40%

10.328
8.670
3.054
4.034
16.14

11.787
11.008
4.571
5.182
22.57

2002 Sample
Difference
t-Statistic
–1.45
–2.05**
–2.11**
–2.08**
–3.15***

Generalist
with Market
Share > 40%

Generalist
with Market
Share < 40%

Difference
t-Statistic

12.018
8.609
1.001
1.483
9.14

12.886
12.342
1.106
1.551
16.21

–1.07
–1.79*
–2.04**
–1.81*
–1.96**

B: The Case of Insufficient Market Share
1997 Sample

oROA (%)
Three-year oROA (%)
CAR (%)
Three-year CAR (%)
Price–earnings ratio

Generalist
with Market
Share > 40%

Generalist
with Market
Share < 40%

3.581
8.157
2.051
3.015
15.32

21.872
18.775
4.215
6.344
34.90

2002 Sample
Difference
t-Statistic
–5.42***
–4.05***
–2.03**
–2.57***
–2.07**

Generalist
with Market
Share > 40%

Generalist
with Market
Share < 40%

2.129
4.8304
.941
1.242
4.78

8.765
8.308
2.111
2.458
12.08

Difference
t-Statistic
–4.64***
–2.49***
–2.21**
–2.25**
–3.04***

*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

for robustness. Only the key variables of these tests appear
in Table 7, demonstrating further the robustness of our findings. Among others, the 15% cutoff seems to provide more
significant findings and better fit for the R3 effect, with tolerable deterioration in the ditch effect. However, maximizing model fit may have a limiting effect on predictive
power. We propose that further inquiry and delineation of
each boundary is warranted.

Managerial Implications
In general, our findings support Sheth and Sisodia’s (2002)
Rule of Three theory at the expense of many prior studies
on the market share–profitability relationship. We summarize the implications in three parts: for top management, for
marketing, and for investors.
Implications for Top Management
Our generalizations regarding the relationship between
market share and profitability do not preclude the existence
of situational or conditional variables that might confound or
even negate the sign of the relationship. Therefore, our findings should be accompanied by precaution against growth
simply for the sake of growth. For example, using sales promotions to buy market share has been shown to hurt profitability even in the long run (Lodish and Mela 2007).
We found that generalists with excessive market share
perform worse than their smaller counterparts in the long
run. Similarly, our findings imply that specialists may jeopardize their financial performance and even end up in finan-

cial distress in pursuit of market share. Thus, these firms
may be better off by “outsourcing” some of their less- or
unprofitable customers for potential gains in margins. In
this regard, it should also be acknowledged that the right
size for any firm is context specific (Prescott, Kohli, and
Venkatraman 1986) and depends on the characteristics of
the market, the state of the economy, technological conditions, strategic choice, and objectives.
When further growth appears to offer strategic benefits,
this can be achieved organically over time (through marketing) or through merger-and-acquisition (M&A) activity.
Such M&A activity can also boost overall industry profitability if it consolidates the number of generalists to (or
toward) three. Top management of any firm must make a
decision whether to become/remain a generalist (by drawing
from a wide range of resources) or a specialist (through focus)
in the firm’s respective industry. It also appears that a generalist needs to exceed a market share threshold to become
viable in the long run. However, the closer a firm is to the
ditch and the more crowded the generalist space, the higher
is the likelihood of falling into it. Full benefits of the Rule
of Three should not be taken as given, even if a firm resides
in an R3 industry. Top management must pay close attention
to steer clear of the 5%–10% ditch area, or investors will be
disappointed, and eventually the firm may become a target
for M&A (e.g., Kmart). Alternatively, a firm in the ditch can
divest and emerge as a healthy specialist (e.g., IBM from a
personal computer maker to a service provider).
Long gone are the times when the role of industry structure was preeminent in formal strategic planning (Mintz-
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TABLE 7
Robustness Tests Using Alternative Lower Boundary Share Measures for Generalists
A: Univariate Tests
Generalist
Share Cutoff
Year

10%
1997

12.5%
2002

1997

15%

2002

Difference in oROA
R3 – G0, 1, 2
11.298*** 10.215** 11.542*** 9.016**
(3.14)
(2.24)
(3.11)
(2.09)
R3 – G4, 5+
11.096*** 8.12*** 11.251*** 8.164***
(4.15)
(3.15)
(4.05)
(2.31)
Generalist – ditch
4.287***
.663
5.148*** 1.678*
(2.55)
(1.23)
(2.52)
(1.76)
7.287** –1.153
6.991**
.348*
Specialist – ditch
(2.18) (–1.25)
(2.19)
(1.72)

1997

17.5%
2002

11.600***
(3.09)
11.38***
(4.88)
7.334***
(2.68)
6.297**
(2.21)

8.694***
(3.10)
9.592***
(2.61)
3.11*
(1.82)
.629*
(1.75)

20%

1997

2002

1997

2002

7.564**
(2.18)
5.483*
(1.83)
5.148**
(2.06)
6.014**
(2.19)

4.152*
(1.94)
6.140**
(2.04)
2.741*
(1.70)
.315
(1.19)

3.037
(1.65)
3.33*
(1.71)
3.368*
(1.70)
5.467**
(2.16)

1.644
(1.66)
2.342*
(1.69)
1.32
(1.60)
–.011
(–.41)

B: Regressions
Generalist
Share Cutoff
Year

10%
1997

2002

12.5%
1997
2002

oROA (DV)
R3

15%
1997

2002

17.5%
1997
2002

.13**
.136***
.141**
.145***
.158*** .149**
.137**
(2.03)
(3.77)
(2.07)
(3.81)
(2.33)
(3.83)
(2.04)
R3 × market share .049***
.066**
.051*** .069***
.054*** .073**
.043**
(2.63)
(2.01)
(2.64)
(2.04)
(2.70)
(2.11)
(2.29)
R3 × market
concentration
.081**
.138***
.089**
.124***
.094*** .139***
.079**
(2.06)
(3.31)
(2.15)
(3.06)
(2.33)
(3.34)
(2.05)
.37
.421
.376
.435
.403
.448
.369
Adjusted R2

Ditch
Adjusted R2

20%
1997

2002

.132***
.119*
(2.94)
(1.95)
.061**
.038**
(2.00)
(2.21)

.124**
(2.23)
.048*
(1.87)

.128***
.061*
(3.09)
(1.94)
.429
.312

.108***
(2.54)
.391

–.038*** –.054*** –.032*** –.048*** –.020** –.034** –.018*
–.027*
–.010
(–2.73) (–2.56) (–2.67) (–2.37)
(–2.23) (–2.20) (–1.94) (–1.65) (–1.53)
.317
.316
.298
.271
.281
.234
.240
.021
.211

–.020
(–1.61)
.198

*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: G0, G1, G2, and G4 denote industries with 0, 1, 2, and 4 generalists, respectively, and G5+ denotes industries with 5 or more
generalists.

berg 1994). Nevertheless, our findings reaffirm that structural differences are too important to be overlooked by top
management in strategic thinking and decision making. Perhaps the pendulum of practitioner (and academic) attention
that used to be directed solely toward external/industry factors has now swung too far toward the internally focused
resource-based perspective of strategic management
(Boone, Carroll, and Van Witteloostuijn 2004). There is a
need to advance and integrate both perspectives for gestalt.
Implications for Marketing
A primary responsibility of marketing is to drive sales. In
this pursuit, marketing can create selective demand and significantly grow the market share of a firm organically. However, a superseding responsibility of marketing is to
improve and maintain business profitability through brand,
customer, and channel equity. When the costs and risks of
market share growth (e.g., customer acquisition) threaten
performance, marketing can also create primary demand
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and provide growth without necessarily changing market
share. For the market leader approaching the upper limits of
its economies of scale, it might make sense to use marketing to expand the pie and protect share rather than maximize share. Thus, large generalists have much to gain from
comarketing with generalists in other industries or even
with their direct competitors. The new focus would be on
customer recruitment from nonusers instead of annexing
customers from competitors. In some cases, this means a
complete reconsideration and restructuring of how these
firms deploy their big marketing budgets. Furthermore, not
growing market share in the domestic market may also suggest an international growth strategy or even a globalization
imperative.
Our finding that specialists generally perform better
than ditch dwellers runs contrary to most industrial organization literature and challenges the mainstream PIMS-based
literature, which traditionally views high-performing small
firms merely as exceptions (Buzzell and Gale 1987). This

traditional view is myopic in that niche players have a collectively substantial role within the confines of differentiated markets. In contrast, we find high-performing, smallmarket-share firms to be the rule rather than the exception.
At first glance, the main implication for specialists appears
to be to forsake share growth and stay small. Yet this may
not necessarily be the case. We believe that the real message
is to remain focused on core competencies (Hamel and Prahalad 1994) rather than to divert strategic attention toward
firm size or market share. Because of their refined focus in
their relevant markets, specialists can actually enjoy market
leadership in their niches (Sheth and Sisodia 2002). They
may even establish themselves as margin leaders. Thus, the
financial performance of specialists may actually improve
when they market to enhance their (target customer) share
of heart and wallet within their niche but not necessarily
when they grow their overall market share.
Implications for the Investor Community
Our findings also raise several substantial points that should
be explored in further interdisciplinary collaboration
between colleagues in marketing and finance. These include
but are not limited to the following: First, there appears to
be a prevalent R3 industry structure for which performance
benefits are not accurately priced by capital markets. The
disequilibrium in markets implied by our findings suggests
that a portfolio of firms from R3 industries should outperform a portfolio of firms from other industry structures, all
else being equal. Moreover, the conventional practice to
invest in “the best of breed” of any industry to build a diversified portfolio appears sensible only when the number-one
generalist is not overly dominant. Excessively dominant
players get undue respect in financial markets even though
their upside potential is limited.
Second, capital markets usually penalize the stock of
the acquirer and boost that of the target when merger news
are announced (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Our research
implies that both stocks may be warranted a boost if a proposed M&A decreases/increases the number of generalists
to (or toward) three. Furthermore, because an R3 structure
enhances overall industry performance, the financial markets’ reaction to other stocks (in the same industry) should
also be favorable when M&A that converges industry structure to (or toward) an R3 structure is announced, and vice
versa if M&A diverts from R3. Similar reactions in financial markets have recently been shown to occur in response
to phenomena that alter industry structure, such as privatization (e.g., Altintig et al. 2009) and divestitures (Lamont
and Polk 2002).
Finally, ditch dwellers (i.e., those with intermediate
market share) are not good long-term investments but may
make excellent speculative investments in a portfolio,
because their implied financial vulnerability makes them
likely M&A targets. Merger-and-acquisition activity can
offer dramatic short-term boosts to stocks of target firms
(Jensen and Ruback 1983).

Further Research and Limitations
The Rule of Three (Sheth and Sisodia 2002) contains
unique perspectives and many important generalizations
that demand further attention. Our examination focused
entirely on the market structure–profitability relationships
of firms in the United States. We did not examine the Rule
of Three comprehensively, and several noteworthy propositions remain for further research. One such line of inquiry is
the examination of R3 structures in other markets (e.g.,
European Union) and globally.
The Rule of Three also allows for predictions regarding
industry evolution and dynamics. Although we used the
most current data available, it would be worthwhile to use
historical data and determine how successfully the Rule of
Three could predict industry shakeouts and industry-specific
and firm-specific profitability changes over time and in conjunction with other variables. In particular, the interplay
among R3 industry structure, market share, and market concentration appears complex. A deeper examination of industry structure as a moderator is left for future work. Use of
longitudinal data would also enhance the understanding of
industry dynamics and may potentially reveal a feedback
loop effect from profitability to market share/concentration.
The current research represents the first attempt to test
the lawlike generalizations represented by the Rule of
Three. As a result, it focused on the consistent effects rather
than the differences (in direction and magnitude) among
industries. In other words, although our study attempted to
extract the overall generalizations outlined in the Rule of
Three, there remain conditional or situational factors that
might influence its relevance and, thus, its applicability. It
would be worthwhile to ascertain the extent to which the
Rule of Three is applicable to special cases (e.g., pure network industries), to top performers (using data envelopment
analysis), or to specific industry and firm groups. For example, Schwalbach (1991) finds stronger profitability effects
for market share within service industries.
The research to date involving specialists/generalists
has predominantly been conducted in single-industry studies and case settings in which some researchers were able to
distinguish between specialists and generalists according to
niche width. In contrast, our study involved more than 1300
firms from more than 160 industries. Therefore, we did not
categorize specialists, generalists, or the ditch dwellers on
the basis of actual strategic focus. As a result, a small proportion of firms may have been misclassified (e.g., a specialist with more than 10% market share would be categorized
as a generalist, or a generalist with less than 5% market
share would be categorized as a specialist). We have done
our best to address this issue by using a variety of threshold
values to demonstrate the robustness of the findings.
The private sector (firm and investor) benefits of the R3
structure appear to be clear and robust. However, to thoroughly assess the claimed absolute optimality of the structure, its impact (beyond economic efficiency) on a wide
array of consumer welfare factors (i.e., consumer surplus,
innovation, variety, customer satisfaction, convenience,
affordability, price stability, and perceived value) could be
examined in further research. Nevertheless, the Rule of
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Three has vast potential for straightforward public policy
recommendations, especially with regard to M&A activity
and antitrust.
Furthermore, the Rule of Three may be inherently
linked back to basic consumer behavior through the notion
of the “evoked set” because most consumers and industrial
buyers consider approximately three alternatives during the
purchasing process (Howard and Sheth 1969; Sheth and
Sisodia 2002). If so, the transformation and impact of the
evoked set of consumer brands on corporate performance
represent a worthwhile line of research for consumer behaviorists, marketing strategists, and marketing modelers alike.
Note that we do not argue that market share is the only,
or even the main, determinant of performance. When considering a relationship between industry structure and profitability, it is challenging (if not impossible) to move
beyond mere correlation to a determination of causality
(Demsetz 1986; Slade 2004; Wensley 1997). Nonetheless,
our analyses of market share as a leading indicator of performance indicates that it might indeed be related to subsequent firm earnings. As Boulding and Staelin (1993, p. 164)
note, market share “has strategic value, under certain conditions, in that it generates lower costs and thus excess profits.”
We readily acknowledge that the basic relationship between
market share and performance is mediated/moderated by
additional factors and that these indirect effects could surpass and suppress the direct effect (Prescott, Kohli, and
Venkatraman 1986). Although we attempted to control for
the effects of such unobserved variables by including firmspecific dummy variables in our regression models, other
systemic macroeffects may have affected our cross-sectional
estimates. Finally, our data suffer from some of the same
weaknesses as PIMS.3
In conclusion, there appears to be a rich vein of both
theoretical and practical implications that can be drawn
from Sheth and Sisodia’s (2002) Rule of Three. Furthermore, the financial markets do not seem to price these
implications fully into firm valuations. We advocate for
further exploration of the theory and integration of its
insights into business school curricula. We hope that this
pioneering empirical examination will stimulate further
research and advance the conceptualization of these fundamental relationships.

Appendix
Robustness Checks
Because of the controversial nature of some of our hypotheses, we undertook extensive efforts to conduct additional
robustness checks of our findings. We summarize these here.
3As with most PIMS-based studies on the market share–
profitability relationship, our approach relies on cross-sectional
analysis of pooled data. Nonetheless, our methodology offers two
significant advantages over those using PIMS data. First, we used
objective market share data and SEC-reported accounting measures instead of self-reported “served market” measures and disguised financial figures. Second, we captured the small-share
firms that report to the SEC, which enabled us to compare the performance of small firms that are typically excluded from PIMSbased studies (Day 1986).
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Market Definition
Market share measurement is highly sensitive to how markets are defined. Thus, we repeated our analyses using fourdigit and three-digit NAICS classifications and two measures of relative market share (benchmarking against the
top competitor and the top three competitors) when applicable. All results were consistent with theory and qualitatively
the same.
Industry Maturity
Although we used a more inclusive 15-year cutoff to define
industry maturity, 20- and 30-year cutoffs yielded qualitatively equivalent results.
Alternative Performance Measures
We also used oROS (operating income of the firm or unit
divided by the total sales of the firm or unit) and three-year
oROS as performance measures for all tests and revealed
results similar to those of oROA tests. These further bolstered the reliability of the findings because ROS provides
significantly more conservative estimates of the market
share–profitability relationship (Szymanski, Bharadwaj,
and Varadarajan 1993).
Methodological Considerations
We repeated all univariate tests for the medians using
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests, and the results were qualitatively
unchanged. We used multiple approaches for the CAR calculations: We used geometric mean instead of arithmetic
mean in calculating CAR to account for compound effects
of growth. We also calculated arithmetic mean results for
robustness, which yielded stronger results; however, the
more conservative geometric results were reported.
Financial Measures
Another common method of calculating long-term stock
market performance in finance literature is to take the difference between the aggregate return on the stock and the
aggregate return on a market portfolio (e.g., Ritter 1991).
We also used this methodology to check for robustness. The
results were stronger and in the same direction. However,
because this method does not adjust for risk, we report the
more conservative risk-adjusted results. In addition to the
CRSP value-weighted index, we used the CRSP equally
weighted index as a proxy for the market portfolio. The
results remained qualitatively unchanged. We also checked
alternative estimation periods for the systematic risk factor
β for robustness. Most common periods used in the finance
literature are three, five, or ten years before the abnormal
return calculation date (Barber and Lyon 1997). The results
using [–60, –12] months and [–36, –12] months around the
abnormal return calculation were qualitatively the same. We
conservatively report the results with the longest estimation
period (i.e., ten years).
The Ditch/Generalist Distinction
Theoretically, generalists and specialists are best distinguished by strategic breadth versus focus, an approach well
suited for single-industry studies (Peli and Nooteboom

1999). However, in practice, generalists (specialists) in
mature industries are consistently characterized and measured as relatively large (small) in size, market share, and
industry influence (e.g., Sorenson et al. 2006). As we noted
previously, several researchers also identify a range of intermediate market share in which firms tend to perform worse.
In the operationalization of these distinctions, the issue
emerges of how best to demarcate the boundaries between
these market share regions. Sheth and Sisodia (2002) argue
for a 10% threshold dividing generalists and ditch firms.
Similarly, Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan (1975) suggest the
existence of a minimum critical share level, observing that
profitability typically decreases when firms have less than
10% market share. Various researchers in economics have
empirically demonstrated that market power (manifested as
a positive influence on profitability) consistently emerges
when the largest firms control a combined minimum of
45%–59% market share (Parry and Bass 1990; Rhodes and
Cleaver 1973; Scherer 1980). Under conservative reasoning, the largest minimum firm size necessary to exert this
influence in an R3 industry would be one-third of this requisite combined share (i.e., 15%–20%). Buzzell and Wiersama (1981) observe that the ratio that best fits the actual
distribution of market share is .63 of the next-largest firm
(tending to range from .6 to .65). Conservatively, when we
use the largest combined share identified as imparting market power (i.e., 59%), this size distribution results in the
third-largest firm possessing a market share of slightly
above 10% (i.e., 10.28%). Using similar logic, Henderson
(see BCG 1976; Henderson 1979) claims that no firm can

be viable if it has less than 25% of the largest competitor’s
market share. Given that the average market share of the top
generalists is approximately 41% in our R3 industry sample
and 39% in our overall sample, the third-largest firm would
have approximately 10% market share using this .5 ratio
(4:2:1 proportion). Thus, with our sample averages, 10%
also emerges as a defensible minimum cutoff choice. However, Henderson (see BCG 1976; Henderson 1979) claims,
and Kwoka (1979) finds, that an individual firm market
share of at least 15% is required to have a positive influence
over industry profit levels.4 As a result of these plural perspectives, and with the goal of maximizing the generalizability of our findings, we examined the issue of market
power using a broad range of generalist/ditch thresholds
(see Table 7).
We conducted additional sensitivity analyses to establish the boundary market share conditions for each category.
For generalists, analyses repeated at every percentage point
revealed that significance of the results disappeared outside
the 9%–21% market share range. Similarly, for specialists,
analyses were repeated at every .5 percentage point, and
significance of the results disappeared outside the 3%–7%
range. Therefore, we consider the findings robust for alternative specifications of market share.
4Henderson’s (BCG 1976) article (which argues for a 4:2:1
ratio) would not accommodate a third competitor with 15% market
share, because the combined market share of the top three would
then become 15% + 30% + 60% = 105%, even without accounting
for any specialists.
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